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The building of a non-natural conscious system requires more than the design of 
physical or virtual machines with intuitively conceived abilities, philosophically 
elucidated architecture or hardware homologous to an animal’s brain.  Human 
society might one day treat a type of robot or computing system as an artificial 
person.  Yet that would not answer scientific questions about the machine’s 
consciousness or otherwise.  Indeed, empirical tests for consciousness are 
impossible because no such entity is denoted within the theoretical structure of 
the science of mind, i.e. psychology.  However, contemporary experimental 
psychology can identify if a specific mental process is conscious in particular 
circumstances, by theory-based interpretation of the overt performance of 
human beings.  Thus, if we are to build a conscious machine, the artificial 
systems must be used as a test-bed for theory developed from the existing 
science that distinguishes conscious from non-conscious causation in natural 
systems.  Only such a rich and realistic account of hypothetical processes 
accounting for observed input/output relationships can establish whether or not 
an engineered system is a model of consciousness.  It follows that any research 
project on machine consciousness needs a programme of psychological 
experiments on the demonstration systems and that the programme should be 
designed to deliver a fully detailed scientific theory of the type of artificial mind 
being developed – a Psychology of that Machine. 
 
Introduction 
Computer scientists and engineers have long dreamt of building embodiments of 
consciousness based on silicon chips.  Some important progress has been made, at 
least in clearing the ground.  Current state of the art was illustrated in a special issue 
of this Journal in 2003 on “Machine Consciousness.”   
Discussion of such projects with neuroscientists has recently intensified in 
Europe.  The European Commission’s research programmes include the Factor-10 
Project (Knoll & de Kamps, 2003) and one priority for their programme on Future 
and Emerging Technologies is the whole topic of next steps in machine intelligence, 
e.g. the previous “Beyond Robotics” and the proposed “Bio-inspired Intelligent 
Information Systems” listed at the http://fp6.cordis.lu.ist/fet/fetid-proplist.cfm page.  
Multidisciplinary workshops on engineered “models” of consciousness were held in 
Birmingham and Turin in the autumn of 2003, led by software and hardware 
engineers and scientists, and bringing in theoretical neurobiologists at Birmingham.   
This paper points to limitations in those discussions as viewed by a 
multidisciplinary scientist and philosophy graduate, without training in computer 
hardware engineering or any skills in programming but with diverse experience in 
specifying the quantitative simulation of psychosocial and psychobiological sub-
systems (Booth, 1978a, 1988, 2002; Booth & Freeman, 1993; Booth et al., in press; 
www.qualityliving.org).   
The strategies currently advocated within the community working on “Models of 
Consciousness” do not make use of principles that are well established in the 
philosophy of science.  The community also makes no use of the scientific concept of 
a conscious process as implemented within cognitive experimental psychology.  
These two deficiencies are intimately related.  This paper argues that failure to rectify 
both of them will have dire consequences for the enterprise of engineering conscious 
systems.  
 
Building boxes versus building knowledge 
The modelling of consciousness is currently dominated by an assumption that the 
procedure to follow is Design Æ Build Æ Test (DBT).  This sequence is entirely 
appropriate to the practice of engineering: professional engineers must get on with 
producing dynamic structures that serve specified functions, using whatever science is 
to hand.  However, such an approach is totally incorrect in engineering research: this 
is supposed to build scientific knowledge, not just to build physical or virtual 
machines.  (DBT may not be peculiar to engineering research on consciousness but 
this Journal is not the place to widen such argument.) 
Like all science, the engineering science of modelling consciousness requires 
empirical theory – in this case, theory that is capable of distinguishing between 
conscious and non-conscious processes.  The scientific method is to build general 
theory by repeatedly cycling through the sequence Hypothesise Æ Test Æ Interpret 
(HTI).  Existing theory is used to generate hypotheses that can be tested in adequately 
specified situations to yield interpretable results.  A cycle is completed by going back 
to the theory, revised or not, to draw out further testable hypotheses.  All stages of 
HTI cycles are fully operationalised and peer reviewed within the community of 
scientists having the relevant expertise.1 
Scientific research into natural consciousness thus requires the building and 
testing of theory about the minds of human beings, or of members of other species on 
earth that may have some forms of consciousness.  Therefore the process of 
improving the scientific understanding of artificial consciousness must include 
analogous research.  A machine worth investigating should be used as what an 
engineer might call a “test bed” but for a scientific theory of the mind of that sort of 
machine, not for ad hoc assessment of the machine’s functioning.   
In other words, the engineer’s sequence of Design Æ Build Æ Test needs to be 
nested within the Test stage of the scientific cycle, of Hypothesise Æ Test Æ Interpret 
and back again through theory development.  The machine needs to be designed and 
built to provide (among other things) evidence for or against hypotheses inferred from 
adequately developed scientific theory of mental processes occurring in the type of 
machine under development. 
 
Brains and bodies in environments 
Engineering cannot be just the building of dynamic structures.  The machines 
have to work, and to work well: that is, they must be adapted to their environment and 
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recognised as having used insights from Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn and others to build a coherent 




the tasks that it imposes on the engineered entity.  Even for bridges, this includes the 
demands of human culture as well as the demands of the weather etc.  The same is 
true of models of consciousness: the machine cannot be designed or tested without 
being so thoroughly networkable to its operating environment(s) that the social 
context is as much part of design and functioning as are the silicon chips and the 
communication and/or robotic interfacing hardware.  This is necessary to the natural 
psychology of language, emotion, infant development, job-employee fit and a fortiori 
consciousness.  It can be no less integral to a psychology of the machine.  
That is, a key part of research in engineering science (and of any science of 
systems) is specifying the operational environment.  The investigators of conscious 
processes in natural systems have to design and construct, or to select, situations in 
which the performance of tasks provides evidence that is important to the theory of 
how the system operates.  They have the good fortune not to have to build and 
educate the human beings or the members of other species that they investigate.2  Yet 
they still have to select their research participants to fit the design of situations and 
tasks to be observed, else the data are unlikely to engage adequately with the 
theoretically crucial hypotheses.  Exactly the same, the investigator of artificial 
systems needs to design and to build an effective theory-developing unit, both the 
machine and also a range of hypothesis-testing scenarios and demands.  Just building 
boxes to do tricks in DBT mode is not scientific research. 
2 Modellers of consciousness are lucky enough (or such a long way from their objectives as) not to face 
the ethical constraints yet that face breeding or even just using natural subjects for experiments.  If 
engineers seriously believe that they are going to build conscious systems in the foreseeable future, 
then they need to start planning soon how they will deal with the relevant parts of the moral issues 
besetting research on young children, human embryos and laboratory animals. 
 That is to say, the modelling of consciousness will not be achieved by developing 
hardware and software that do interesting things, implement intuitive notions of 
different abilities or seem conscious to their creators (Aleksander, 1996).  These 
enterprises can be great fun (and hard work) for the modellers and for those (like 
myself) interested in their efforts.  Nevertheless, building fascinating machines does 
not in itself add to systematic knowledge.   
The need for a scientific psychology of the machine cannot be avoided by 
limiting immediate ambitions to piecemeal modelling in the expectation that in due 
time we shall realise that consciousness has emerged from interactions among clever 
bits and pieces.  This tactic fails to address the fundamental question for the whole 
enterprise: what counts as scientific evidence for the existence of consciousness, even 
in human beings, let alone in ants, bats, chimpanzees, dolphins, elephants, robots from 
a particular line of development or virtual machines with one sort of architecture? 
 
Informal triggers to theory development 
Anecdotes about amazing achievements by natural or artificial systems are used 
in discussions of models of consciousness to point to the subtlety and power of the 
processes that are sometimes involved.  Anecdotes become genuinely productive, 
however, only after they have been used to drive the scientific cycle (theory-HTI-
theory) and have resulted in improved understanding of the intelligence of the carbon 
or silicon system.  If there is a theory (already extant, or to be developed from existing 
theory) that might account for the observed performance, then hypotheses need to be 
generated from it that are testable on systems and situations like that in the anecdote.   
If a robot consisting of an arm and two cameras looks more realistic with 
‘eyebrows’ over the lenses, what matters for science is not speculating on the parts of 
a human face that we should put on a robot to make it look good.  The scientific 
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issues are, for example, what role our own conscious and/or unconscious mental 
processes play in that impression of the robot or attitude to it.  For example, if this 
mentation turns out to be important in human self-identity or empathic experience, the 
science and the engineering can then interact to determine how a robot might be built 
to use its/her/his sight of human beings’ eyebrows in the same way. 
A more proactive approach is to develop scenarios that provide tasks for artificial 
systems to tackle.  However, even a great number and variety of situations in which to 
develop the performance of machines would not help the modelling of consciousness 
unless each scenario were used to test hypotheses from current theory in a way that is 
publishable in the relevant scientific discipline.   
In other words, until the modelling of consciousness adopts the relevant normal 
science (in Kuhn’s sense), there is no basis for advancing scientific knowledge, let 
alone for provoking a paradigm shift like the forming of a scholarly consensus that a 
type of machine is in fact conscious.  Einstein did not advance the physics of motion 
by ignoring Newton’s precise and specific theory, nor Newton by ignoring Aristotle’s. 
 
The dependence of modelling consciousness on psychological science 
In short, the engineer’s dream of building a conscious machine will not be 
realised without constructing the most relevant new arm of engineering science.  The 
engineering of motor vehicles differs from the engineering of bridges in requiring 
development of evidence-based theory of the performance of engines, road wheels, 
cabins and their connections in automotive machines.  Analogously, unlike the 
engineering of communication and information technology, the engineering of 
conscious machines requires the development of evidence-based theory of the 
performance of perceiving, intending, reasoning and feeling systems.  A great deal of 
such theory already exists for systems that we have long been able to investigate 
scientifically.   
Consciousness is an aspect of the mind, at the very least in the case of the mind of 
a normal human adult. Therefore the research discipline that is key to models of 
consciousness is the science (logos) of mind (psuche) as recognised in the worldwide 
community of scholars, nowadays centred on the universities - the century-and-a-half-
old academic area called Psychology.   
The question whether or not a physical or virtual machine is in any way conscious 
involves a highly systematic set of empirical issues on which psychologists and 
behavioural zoologists are the experts.  Effective tackling of such problems is outside 
the competence of academic disciplines not constituted by the study of individual 
minds in action.  The scientific part-solutions existing for natural systems are already 
far more precisely realistic than the philosophically most sophisticated commonsense.  
As in all science and engineering, to solve the problems we need empirically dense 
theory to have been developed by much testing of key hypotheses against the 
sophisticated collection and interpretation of replicable observations, i.e. a basic 
science of consciousness of any sort of system in its home situation or ecological 
niche.   
An education in the role of conscious and non-conscious processes in present-day 
scientific theory of human minds also inoculates against infection by still virulent 
pseudo-problems about ineffable private events that the later Wittgenstein debunked 
60 years ago, such as treating phenomenological expressions as observational data (cf. 
Booth, 2004).  Forty years before that, the Introspectionist school in American 
psychology was forced by its own “evidence” to recognise the fallacy of treating 
subjective experience as the primary source of scientific data on the workings of the 
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mind.  That approach was refuted by experiences of unconscious processes “entering” 
introspectable consciousness, e.g. as flash memories.  Although some cognitivists still 
succumb to the fallacy, the basic point keeps being rediscovered within normal 
scientific development.  For example, details of social events “leave” consciousness 
in the amnesia for influences on one’s actions (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) that results 
from our thinking being directed by our theories of ourselves. 
In addition, reliance on psychological science escapes the arbitrariness of 
politico-legal approaches, such as acknowledging the conscious (or personal) status of 
some robots when they become good enough members of human society or 
convincing enough prominent intuitivists (and maybe even the mysterians) by their 
professions of self-consciousness, i.e. attributing consciousness to others and counting 
themselves among them.  (Animal behaviour experts reckon that pet dogs count 
themselves as part of the pack led by their owners but a robot seeking membership of 
human society would have to communicate this viewpoint linguistically and convince 
juridically and politically acceptable national or international commissions.) 
It may well be correct ethically to regard such moves as a proper consequence of 
creating a conscious machine (if we ever did).  Yet acknowledging this prospect fails 
to address the basic epistemological issue of how we could ever have fully rational 
grounds for believing a system to be conscious.  Any number of anecdotes about the 
robot (or by the robot about us) would only flesh out an historical account of such a 
change in society.  There would be no scientific understanding of what had happened 
and therefore no fundamental empirical rationale for accepting the new social 
conventions.  
 
Psychology, neuroscience and social research 
Scientific understanding of consciousness (as an aspect of the mind) not only is 
the task of psychology but also is that discipline’s task alone.  Neither neuroscientists 
nor social researchers can study conscious processes without using the relevant 
knowledge and skills of the current academic discipline of studying people’s minds. 
Brain imaging tells us nothing about the mental processes themselves that achieve 
conscious experience.  It may tell us where some of the necessary synaptic fields are 
located but knowledge of what a metabolically or electrically active region has to do 
with consciousness depends entirely on the adequacy of purely psychological 
evidence on the performance of the possessors of the brains imaged. 
Neuroscience, Evolutionary Biology, Economics, Political Science, Cultural 
Anthropology and other mechanistic and/or historical disciplines provide crucial 
explanations of the embodiment and/or the acculturation of the minds evidenced 
psychologically.  They also add to the bases for speculating about the biological, 
social or ontogenetic origins of our species’ capacity for mind.  Yet these other 
disciplines are no more than background for what is now the professional province of 
those with a graduate level of education in psychological science and a research 
training in at least one of its major branches.   
These specialisations of basic psychology include social psychology, biological 
psychology, developmental psychology and the study of adult physical perception, 
thought and action.  All areas are cognitive in a broad sense but this latter area is 
called cognitive psychology in a narrower sense; this is rooted in the laboratory 
tradition within psychology, which was sustained in the face of American 
behaviorism in the second quarter of the 20th century by the basic and applied 
experimental psychologists in Cambridge UK (Broadbent, 1961, 1973). 
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Study both of the neural and somatic wetware and also of the historical culture on 
which each human mind depends tells us nothing of the reality that is the system of 
mental phenomena themselves or of how that type of causation operates.  Similarly, 
inspection of the hardware or even the binary states of the compiled code in which the 
virtual machine is implemented tells us nothing of the algorithms by which the system 
performs successfully.  
To explain the relationships between brain and mind or between culture and 
mind, or among all three, a quite different sort of theory will be needed from those of 
each of brain, culture or mind.  The theory of these systems’ or levels’ relations 
cannot be causally mechanistic, in any manner like neurophysiology, psychology or 
economics.  Probably such theory will have to be developmental, explaining the 
ontogenesis of each mind through successive gene-environment interactions (GxE) in 
the growing individual.  This developmental psychology has to account for the 
increasing autonomy that arises from the earlier succession of GxE, at least when the 
individual has a healthy brain and normal social culture, even if with serious bodily or 
familial handicaps (like being blind or having been orphaned in infancy without 
effective fostering).   
In consequence, the consciousness-engineering research programme itself has to 
be based on multidisciplinary developmental science, as some have recognised.  The 
intelligent artificial system will have “innate” capacities but they will only be able to 
“grow” actual competence (e.g. in thinking and feeling) through education and 
training within social cultures and physical ecologies that are adapted to their 
capacities.  Also these cultures will have to adapt as the capacities and competencies 
of engineered individuals and artificial-plus-natural functional groups increase and 
diversify.  Furthermore, if there is relevance in human history and in communication 
and the use of tools in groups of other primates, once these developing artificial 
systems are making some progress within their niche(s) in human society, they may 
have to be left to interact with each other without further intensive interventions by 
engineers: freedom is a condition for intelligence, as well as the other way round.   
It should be noted that neither this ontogenic development nor the cultural history 
of a new sort of system bears any mechanistic similarity to processes of evolution by 
survival of the fittest.  Furthermore, despite (or because of!) the popularity of 
evolutionary explanations (and their connections also with the great hopes pinned on 
genomics), I doubt that phylogenetic biology, psychology or socio-biology will be of 
much use in the scientific hard graft of evidence-based construction of this ‘inter-
causal’ theory.  The main reason for my scepticism is the dearth of even observational 
data on evolution, let alone the infeasibility of controlled experiments, unlike the vast 
scope of investigations already started and envisagable that can feed into a 
multidisciplinary ontogenetic science of the life and minds of human beings and other 
terrestrial species and historical niches. 
 
Psychology, philosophy and engineering 
The mysterian approach to the “hard problem” of relating subjective experience 
to objective reality is to treat it as a genuine issue but beyond resolution by science 
and/or philosophy.  Recognition of the relevance of psychological science takes away 
the main underpinnings of that position. 
The brain/mind problem has been addressed by philosophical categories like 
supervenience (Chalmers, 1996), “non-reductive” reduction to classical or quantum 
physics (Ross & Spurrett, 2004), or the venerable conceptual apparatus for contrasting 
identity (with no coherent mapping within the supposed brain-mind) with dualism 
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(requiring the pseudo-causal notion of interaction between the mind and the brain or 
brain plus environs: Booth, 1978b).  The empirical crudity of all these categories is 
shown up once psychology is acknowledged as an entire science autonomous of 
neuroscience (and of evolution, cultural history or introspection).  Then the problem 
of consciousness can be recognised as amenable to solution but within science, not by 
philosophy.  Thus, one necessary condition for the engineering of consciousness is 
sufficient advance in the scientific evidence on the workings of minds as such, 
especially human minds.   
Larger ambitions in explanation and modelling of consciousness require good 
understanding also of the roles in the mind of the social and physical culture and of 
the brain and body.  However, before it becomes possible to conceive of even these 
merely psycho-cultural or merely psycho-neural wings of the superordinate 
multidisciplinary science, each particular sort of organisation of reality must be 
recognised for what it is.  As implied earlier, physiological, social and mental 
processes each have their own distinctive state-to-state causation, forming an 
internally complete network of causation of each sort of system, such as a human 
person, society or physiology.  Scientific knowledge at each level has long been 
sufficient to preclude any mapping across such types of reality, whether from state at 
one level to state at another level (especially as a causal relationship) or from function 
to function (nomologically).  This is a major reason to expect the superordinate theory 
to be non-causal, maybe ontogenetic.   
The relevance of this vision now becomes more evident: operational 
understanding of the ontogeny across all levels of a natural consciousness is exactly 
the sort of science that engineers need in order to build a physical and virtual machine 
to operate on a solar planet within human society.   In any case, it should be clear that 
the engineering of models of consciousness depends on some sort of scientific theory 
that encompasses the material and virtual machinery, the ecological and socio-
economic functioning of the artificial systems and, equally crucially, their 
psychology.  
 
Pre-scientific psychological constructs  
The pre-history of scientific psychology is littered with empirically untestable 
labels for aspects of the human mind.  St Paul had the flesh warring against the spirit. 
Mediaeval neo-Aristotelians had their four humours.  Freud had an id, ego and 
superego.   
In the late 19th century, the academic psychologists talked about “faculties” of 
the mind, such as cognition, conation and affect.  These also were atheoretical 
constructs.  They survive only as labels on journals, textbooks and undergraduate 
degree modules.  The terms don’t do any actual science. 
This is the weakness also in engineering that seeks to create “abilities” to think, 
attend, learn, and to have sensations, emotions, images, memories and so on.  Perhaps 
the most advanced such use of constructs from psychological science is the “cognitive 
technology” of Haikonen (2003).  Unlike the “cognitive technology” for analysing the 
minds of consumers (Freeman et al., 1993), however, there is as yet no psychology 
which is experimentally testable on models using this sort of hardware.  The 
terminology borrowed from psychology may help engineers to work out some 
differences between sorts of chip or of functioning machine.  Be that as it may, the 
flaw in this sort of approach is that it does not help to build the scientific theory of the 
mental processes in a piece of cognitive technology that is needed in order to 
determine if any of the system’s achievements involve conscious processes. 
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It has been pointed out that virtual machines with any chance of being conscious 
will have to be constructed with complex “architecture,” e.g. separate sets of reactive, 
deliberative and reflective processes (Sloman, 2002).  I can’t comment on whether or 
not this helps software engineers to distinguish different things that their programs 
should do.  What I can see is that this approach has yet to move to making concrete 
advances in the theory needed to characterise specific and contentful algorithmic 
processes that account for the performance of the machine and hence to giving an 
opportunity for the structuring observations that could distinguish conscious from 
non-conscious mentation. 
Psychological scientists themselves still sometimes use these unoperationalisable 
generic concepts as a substitute for genuine theory – for example, the “central 
executive” which is invoked to coordinate attention and effortful remembering.  
However, research papers using this term explicitly acknowledge that it is a cover for 
the current lack of testable theory on the management of concurrent processes of 
multiple types, of which there is considerable empirical understanding in each case 
but nothing much on how they interact (e.g., Baddeley, 1992).  The standing scientific 
challenge is to break up that suspiciously autonomous and homunculus-like box into 
boxes having distinct functions but with some explicit processes for exchange or 
integration with other functions.  Indeed, it has been argued (consistently with this 
paper) that there can be no central executive or any other generic function in the mind, 
because all cognitive processes are content-specific (Allport, 1980).   
 
Finding meaning in the concept of a conscious process 
This view of a science of consciousness and mental architecture fits with widely 
accepted philosophical conclusions about the relationships of terms in empirical 
statements to what is going on in the observable world (e.g., Quine, 1973).  Very few 
(if any) terms in an empirical theory can be mapped onto objects in the world or even 
onto a delimited set of observational or experimental data.  
This position on the science of minds, brains and societies also builds on the later 
Wittgenstein’s debunking of introspection, without a tinge of the behaviourism that 
some read into his approach.  Indeed, it was probably the behaviorist (sic) thinking at 
the time of which Wittgenstein (1953) wrote that psychology consists of experiments 
and conceptual confusion.  He could have had in mind the then dominant   
behaviorists’ concepts such as ‘reinforcement’ (Peters, 1954) and ‘stimulus’ (Hamlyn, 
1957).  These were failed attempts at physicalist reductions of intent (Anscombe, 
1963) and percept (Hamlyn, 1957): they systematically traded on verbal ambiguity to 
hide the fallacy of sustaining a materialist monism in the face of any non-physical 
aspect of reality.  Such philosophically crass ideas certainly did not afflict Bartlett’s 
psychological experiments in the 1930s in the University of Cambridge (where 
Wittgenstein was also working).  Nevertheless, the mentalist (now termed cognitivist) 
tradition that survived behaviorism was strongly infected by the introspectionists’ 
concepts of the contents of conscious as a source of scientific data.  Indeed, the 
introspectionist fallacy survives to this day among many non-psychologists when their 
research or practice touches on mental states or processes (cf. Booth, 2004).  
It is quite wrong to suppose that Wittgenstein argued anything that should be 
called a denial of the existence of consciousness.  His point was that, if we are aware 
of something, it is some aspect of the objective world that we are attending to, not the 
contents of some private world of awareness.  Scientific study of the processes of 
attention may not be easy but Wittgenstein himself was very clear that there were 
legitimate empirical issues about the aspect of the world to which a person is 
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attending at any given moment: does the diagram look like a duck right now, or is it a 
rabbit?  Indeed, the hermeneutic problem of determining if it is (meant to be) a rabbit 
may be insoluble in an art-form, as the deconstructionists claim.  Nevertheless, what a 
zoologist’s sketch means about the species can be constructed from the theoretical 
context, which itself can be tested against reality in a myriad of ways. 
The Introspectionists’ programme had collapsed into incoherence in the face of 
the phenomenology of memory, perception and action before the Behaviorists had 
begun to formulate their ideology.  The field was left open to behavioristic denial of 
the objective existence of the mind because mechanistically interpretable analysis of 
observable performance was unconvincing.  Only later did experimentally based 
theory of cognitive processes became sufficiently rich and precise to tie down the 
distinctions between different sorts of processes, including conscious and non-
conscious processes.   
As late as 1940, a famous report concluded that it was not possible to measure 
sensations, in the sense of the private experiences of stimulation by pressure, heat, 
tastants etc.  At that time, the concept of sensation had yet to be adequately anchored 
into observationally based theoretical structures.  Over the last 20-30 years, however, 
scientific theory of mental performance has had to develop, so that now it is feasible 
to generate testable distinctions between cognitive processes that do and do not 
involve conscious processes.  Examples include mental rotation of three-dimensional 
figures, explicit recall of past material versus recognising the material as coming from 
the past but with no recollection of context, and being influenced by a sight while not 
being able to say anything about the sight.  The psychologists’ tests of hypotheses 
relying on the theoretical distinction between conscious and non-conscious versions 
of a particular process can be applied to distinguish between (a) perceiving an aspect 
of the situation (in the sense of acting successfully with regard to it) without any 
subjective experience of that aspect and (b) perceiving that aspect while conscious of 
it.  
The relative recency of such capacity in psychological science illustrates why 
teams attempting to program abilities into machines need to include members having 
the education and training to test psychological theory on such systems.    
 
Tests for specified conscious processes  
It is a truism that processes within a complex system cannot in general be 
specified solely from relationships between outputs and inputs.  However, science 
does not work by induction of explanations from observations.1  Rather, hypotheses 
are deduced from the theory that can be used to design experiments or to select 
observations that test for processes which the data by themselves could not identify.  
If we have a rich enough theory of the processes in systems that are agreed to be 
conscious, we can look for evidence in input/output relationships of these or 
sufficiently similar systems for the distinction between conscious and non-conscious 
processing. 
All that can be observed of a mind is its expression in relations between the 
system’s outputs to the environment and its inputs from the environment.  Certain 
relationships demonstrate an overt achievement by the system facing a task within a 
scenario.  This is traditionally known in psychology as ‘performance’ or (most 
misleadingly) ‘behaviour.’3  Yet, in the cases relevant to consciousness, what is being 
tested is the presence or absence of content of subjective experience being necessary 
to explain the observed performance, as specified by a differential hypothesis 
embedded within a rich theory about how human minds actually work.  This approach 
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can be extended to a rat’s mind, an insect’s landing gear and central nervous system, 
or an engineered model.  In all cases, the prerequisite is that currently viable 
theoretical explanations include distinctions between conscious and non-conscious 
processes or some effectively equivalent distinctions among hypothesised 
information-processing mechanisms.   
Footnote 3.  Even for a radical environmentalist within psychology or the crypto-physicalist 
behaviourism of Hull and Pavlov, behaviour is not mere movement; it is control by stimulation.  In 
plain English, action is always informed by perception. 
 
Current scientific use of the concept of consciousness 
As acknowledged above, for systems of interesting complexity, observed 
relationships between outputs and inputs are not sufficient to identify internal states.  
However, input-output functions are not nearly so limited as diagnostics if they are 
used within a rich and much-tested theory of the type of information-processing 
system under investigation.  A fast-growing number of experimental paradigms yield 
just such results when the observations are interpreted within established 
psychological theory in terms of a distinction between awareness and unawareness.   
These can be illustrated by three examples from the cognitive psychology of the 
1990s that operate on the borderline of conscious processing.  These paradigms all 
depend on at least one stimulus and two responses, one specific to the stimulus and 
another that is evoked also by other stimuli (where ‘stimulus’ and ‘response’ simply 
mean patterns of input and output that are functional for the system).  The results can 
substantiate the use of a distinction between unconscious and conscious processing, 
thereby giving a scientific use within a theoretical framework for a concept of being 
aware of or subjectively experiencing something. 
Priming is now very widely used in many parts of experimental psychology.  In 
this design, the first stimulus presented is so weak or brief that it does not reliably 
evoke its specific response.  That stimulus is presented again, or another stimulus that 
evokes the same generic response as the first stimulus.  That response to the second of 
the sequence of two stimuli will be faster (and/or more reliable) than the response to 
the same stimulus in a test in which the first stimulus was not presented.  
 The intriguing phenomenon of ‘subliminal’ perception has now been tied down 
by measurement of the detectability (d') parameter of signal detection theory of the 
first stimulus by its specific response and by the generic response (Merikle & 
Cheesman, 1987; Merikle et al., 2001).  There is subception of the first stimulus when 
it is not detected by its specific response (i.e. was unconscious, if perceived at all) but 
is detected by the generic response, i.e. it was indeed perceived, but unconsciously. 
Thirdly, the discrimination of differences in strength of the first stimulus by 
gradations in its specific response can itself be differentially discriminated (i.e. 
influenced quantitatively) by gradations of a generic response.  When this relationship 
between a stimulus and its response is better discriminable by the generic response 
than is either the stimulus itself or the conceptual state controlling the specific 
response, then there is "deeper" discriminative processing of information.  This might 
correspond to a subjective experience such as a sensation or an emotion, if one also 
makes the testable hypotheses that (for sensation) best discrimination of the stimulus, 
when it occurs, is unconscious or (for emotion) the generation of the specific response 
is without experienced affect (Booth & Freeman, 1993). 
These distinctions within priming, detection and discrimination are drawn for all 
sorts of cognitive process, not just the perception of physical situations.  For any 
cognitive process to be diagnosable, its input has to be influenced by external 
stimulation.  The stimuli can be verbal, or symbolic in some other way, e.g. the 
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statement of a premise in reasoning or the past experience of a choice between an 
action and an alternative (remembered intention).  The process must also influence 
some output, but this response also can be symbolic rather than concrete: that is, the 
output can be statements that differentiate between situations; it does not have to be 
physical acts.  The paradigm known as ‘priming’ has been applied to memories 
(perception of past situations), images (perception of situations not currently sensed), 
emotions (perception of social situations) and thoughts (perception of potential 
dialogue). 
In work on implicit and explicit memory, for example explicit recollections or 
implicit memories as in expectations (Stacy, 1997) or reasons for actions, intentions, 
decision making or the Will (Frith, 1990), the usual methods seek qualitative 
differences or measure detection.  Discrimination between difference levels of input 
can also be used.  Such an experimental analysis would end the looseness of the 
protracted discussions of Libet’s sign of pre-conscious decision and would show 
whether or not the evidence on the sequence of conation meets the scientific criteria 
that the discussants have assumed inituitively.   
The same applies to artificial systems that are claimed to have abilities such as 
having mental images, experienced emotions, contentful thoughts and meaningful 
uses of a human language (Haikonen, 2003).   The thinking or the emotion has to be 
affected by some external stimulus, but this can be verbal or symbolic in some other 
way and so the paradigms are not limited to perceptual processes. 
Even self-consciousness is amenable to scientific investigation once the theory of 
cognition is rich enough.  Once cognitive psychological theory has been developed 
under the challenges set by well designed sets of experiments or observations,4  it will 
be feasible to determine the environmental contingencies under which a neural sign of 
self-consciousness is seen (Taylor, 2000). 
Footnote 4. Note that of course this requires research programmes, not anecdotal observation or one-
shot experiments. 
 
Adaptation of natural psychology to artificial minds 
The processes invoked by the scientific theory of natural minds are unlikely, 
however, to transfer to the design of artificial minds without considerable adaptation.  
The virtual machine in the human person is implemented in algorithms (i.e., cognitive 
processing), code (e.g., highly distributed patterns of axonal and dendritic potentials 
and thoroughly inexplicit non-verbal communication and informal cultural dynamics) 
and processors (i.e., sparsely adapting but richly interconnected dendritic trees and 
interlocking institutions with indeterminate openings for creativity and criminality) 
that will never be mimicked in silicon or molecular (nano) technologies or internet 
transfers.    
Indeed, it is a misconception of the nature of mind to attempt to engineer 
machines that are conscious by simulating some aspect of the human being.  Like any 
other machinery, computing systems should be designed to do what is needed as well 
as possible with the hardware and software available.  When identifiable artificial 
systems begin to play intelligent roles in human society, then scientific investigation 
of machine consciousness can begin.  The relevant parts of then-current psychological 
theory can be adapted to the physical embodiment and the social context of a system 
and hypotheses derived that could provide interpretable data on conscious processes 
from the system’s performance in appropriately designed scenarios.  The results will 
instigate further adaptation and elaboration of the psychological theory to this 
‘species’ of model.  We may then begin to understand the sense in which those 
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systems are conscious and also various ways in which their consciousness is similar to 
ours and different from it.   
A research programme on engineered models of consciousness is unlikely to be 
able to use the theory of the minds of human beings, or of rats, bees, chimpanzees and 
other animals, exactly as it exists.  By definition the hardware is very different.  AI 
research and computational psychology soon learnt that the programming language 
and operating system of a natural mind is very different – so different that it is not 
clear if these computing entities have any direct homologue in animals.   Less 
obviously perhaps, the public life of an engineered intelligence is liable to be very 
different from that of a natural mind.  To deploy a biological concept, the ecological 
niches of robot and distributed systems will be quite distinct from those of human 
beings.  In sociological terms, the role of an engineered member of society would be 
authentic to itself, not authentically human.   
Whatever empathy we may feel for the engineered minds (or believe they feel for 
us) will be practically important.  Yet our knowledge of their consciousness will be 
based solely on objective evidence on how they perceive their environment, their 
actions, the human beings with whom they interact and themselves (Broadbent, 1973). 
 
Research programmes 
It should be clear from all of this that these challenges from natural to artificial 
modelling of consciousness are multi-layered.  Minds and ecologies had to co-evolve 
in nature.  This makes it very likely that engineering scientists can develop conscious 
machines only by developing the social and physical environments in which the 
engineered entities operate and by understanding at an algorithmic level how the 
machines cope with the tasks faced.   
One implication is that the conscious machine will have to perform genuine tasks 
within human society.  This is not just a matter of realpolitik and economics.  It is an 
epistemological and scientific necessity.  There is no way of rationally attributing 
consciousness to the machine except by establishing a biosocial cognitive-behavioural 
science of its life and times by the cycle of theory construction, hypothesis, test and 
interpretation into further theory.  
A corollary is that, even for the purpose of advancing theoretical knowledge, 
straight engineering efforts would best be put into the building of systems that serve 
practical functions that previously only human beings could perform.  The usefulness 
of these machines would not merely be a help in getting the research funded.  
Achieving worthwhile functionality makes it more likely that systematic investigation 
of the system’s performance can be relevant to a science of artificial consciousness.  
That is even more likely if the systems also, for example, manage unusual challenges, 
repair breakdowns and automatically develop more sophisticated functions, as 
creative human beings do by bringing their whole minds to bear, conscious and 
unconscious.   
This is quite different from an argument that the research programme will have 
achieved something worthwhile even if consciousness does not emerge.  The present 
argument is that, whatever the outcome, scientific experts on natural consciousness 
will have to have been involved: the only way of testing for consciousness is to adapt 
existing theory to the system’s range of achievements and then to construct scenarios 
and tasks within them that provide evidence as to whether the system is aware or not 
of some particular aspect of the situation while the task is being tackled.    
The immediate practical implications of the argument are quite mundane.  It will 
not be sufficient for computer scientists and engineers merely to educate themselves 
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in psychological science, even to graduate level.  It is essential that scientists with 
professional research training and continuing productivity in the purely psychological 
understanding of natural systems are integrated into the engineering of consciousness. 
This integration could include multidisciplinary individuals who publish research 
into the cognitive performance of both robots and human beings.  More likely, 
existing hardware and software engineering scientists will work with contemporary 
social, biological and cognitive psychologists and other behavioural scientists in joint 
research programmes.  Such teams could build both increasingly sophisticated 
artificial systems and also new theory that distinguishes conscious from non-
conscious processes in the interactions of those systems with the environment.   
None of this will start until at least a few established workers start running 
publishable experiments on the psychology of the machine and attracting young 
entrants to this so far unrecognised research field. 
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REVIEWS accompanying the Editor’s decision to reject 
 
David A Booth:  






The author proposes that in order to assess whether intelligent machines  
have consciousness it will be necessary to involve psychologists who  
have experience using theory-based approaches to understand  
consciousness in humans. There are a number of assumptions underlying  
this position. Two of the most important are a) that "contemporary  
experimental psychology can identify if a specific mental process is  
conscious in particular circumstances" (p. 1) and b) that "observed  
input/output relationships can establish whether or not an engineered  
system is a model of consciousness" (p. 1). In my opinion, both of these  
assumptions are questionable because they imply that it is possible to  
use third-person data both to identify conscious mental processes and to  
distinguish conscious from unconscious processes. I don't know of any  
experimental psychological approach to the study consciousness based on  
third-person data (e.g., discrimination, detection, RT) where the  
behavioural measures have not been first validated by subjective  
experience (i.e., first-person data). 
 
Perhaps my criticism is incorrect. One way to address the criticism is  
to discuss this issue more thoroughly in the paper. In other words, are  
there any situations in which measures of consciousness based on  
third-person data have been validated independent of any reference to  
subjective experience? I can not think any. If there are any such  
situations or behavioural measures, I would certainly like to know about  
them. Another way to approach this issue would be to discuss Searle's  
Chinese Room thought experiment. The position put forward in the paper  
is clearly at odds with Searle's arguments against a strong Al position. 
 
Another issue that is important to address concerns whether or not  
consciousness is causative. There is the hope expressed in the paper  
that it will be possible to distinguish "conscious from nonconscious  
causation in natural systems" (p. 1). The basis for this optimism is  
unclear to me. I don't know of any research findings in experimental  
psychology which demand an explanation in terms of consciousness.  
Rather, all the findings to date could easily be simulated by machines  
without any reference to consciousness. Thus, there are few if any  
empirical reasons for rejecting the idea that consciousness is an  
epiphenomenon. 
 
Given these criticisms, it's not at all clear to me why psychologists  
would be particularly successful at determining whether intelligent  
machines have consciousness. The only reliable psychological data  
regarding consciousness are first-person data based on reports of  
subjective experiences. Given that first-person data are always used to 
validate third-person data, I don't see how psychological approaches will 
necessarily provide insights into how to determine whether intelligent 









About the paper in general: This paper is an opinion paper. This is not  
a scientific paper; it does not introduce any research results nor any  
new ideas or hypotheses for future research. This is not a philosophical  
paper, either; no philosophical ideas are developed or elaborated here.  
The title of this paper "Scientific requirements for an engineered model  
of consciousness" is misleading as no scientific requirements are  
actually presented here. The only actual message of this paper is that  
psychologists (i.e. David Booth himself) should be involved in research  
programs on machine consciousness. 
 
The author tries to convince the reader by the logically invalid  
argument by authority. In the introduction chapter the author positions  
himself as a multidisciplinary scientist, however without any training  
in computer hardware engineering or programming. Many of the references  
are only given for the purpose of proving the competence; the content of  
these references are not related to (engineered) models of  
consciousness. 
 
The chapter "Building boxes vs. building knowledge" is constructed  
around naïve and misunderstood view of engineering process. The author  
proposes that design engineering were based on the procedure  
design-build-test. This is not the case. Engineers cannot design  
anything without a theory. The actual procedure is iterative and more  
like: develop theory - design experiments - build, test - verify and/or  
modify theory - design and simulate actual equipment - build - test -  
and perhaps start again. This procedure is also used in engineering  
efforts towards machine consciousness. 
 
In the chapter "Psychology, neuroscience and social research" the author  
states: "Similarly, inspection of the hardware or even the binary states  
of the compiled code in which the virtual machine is implemented tells  
us nothing of the algorithms by which the system performs successfully."  
This is not true. The correct or incorrect functioning of a program,  
even the programmed algorithm itself, can be determined by the  
inspection of binary states of the hardware; there is even a specific  
instrument for that, namely the logic analyzer. This kind of work may  
often be tedious, though, but that is beside the point. With this  
fallacious argument the author tries here to argue that the hardware or  
neural wetware were separate from the mental phenomena. 
 
The paper contains an overall problem; the concepts of mind,  
consciousness, self-consciousness, self-history and the contents of  
consciousness are frequently mixed. This is manifested e.g. in the  
sentence: "There is no way of rationally attributing consciousness to  
the machine except by establishing biosocial cognitive-behavioural  
science of its life and times..." 
 
The author argues against the conventional concepts in psychology like  
cognition, conation and affect and maintains that these "survive only as  
labels on journals, textbooks and undergraduate degree modules. The  
terms don't do any actual science". It is true that labels only do not  
do science; e.g. we have not explained anything if we say that a gadget  
amplifies because it is an amplifier. However, I suspect that modern  
psychology does have something in the way of empirically grounded  
structure behind the labels and I think that this view is shared by  
many. Why does the author deny this? The answer is not evident from the  
paper, but can be found at Prof. Booth's web site. Prof Booth subscribes  
to "Individualised cognitive analysis". 
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According to Prof. Booth's web site "Individualised cognitive analysis  
provides direct evidence as to what is going on in a person's mind (or  
in any well adapted system's performance) while tackling a task such as  
recognising and acting appropriately towards an object, a social  
situation, an emotional state or a bodily sensation. The evidence can be  
purely verbal, from an adequately structured conversation, or can be  
concrete actions or expressed dispositions in response to physically  
defined stimuli or culturally meaningful symbols (such as words or  
pictures). My approach is to compare the person's responses to variants  
of the situation under test that disconfound features from each other  
and from their context. The data from one test occasion are analysed by  
multi-channel discrimination scaling: this is the simplest formulation  
of the classic ideas of dimensions of mental processing, learnt  
Gestalten and the just noticeable difference, and in that sense forms  
the logical foundation of all psychology." (sic). 
 
In this way Prof. Booth effectively denies much of the mainstream  
psychology. 
 
The paper as a whole does dot clearly indicate what superior tools and  
methods psychology could offer to the engineering of machine  
consciousness; the author already admits in the abstract that "Indeed,  
empirical (psychological) tests for consciousness are impossible because  
no such entity is denoted in the theoretical structure of the science of  
the mind, i.e. psychology." This does not prevent the author from  
demanding in the final chapter: "It is essential that scientists with  
professional research training and continuing productivity in the purely  
psychological understanding of natural systems are integrated into the  
engineering of consciousness." 
 
However, would David Booth's "Individualised cognitive analysis" be the  
answer as the author obviously is implicating? More exact arguments,  
substantiated by empirical evidence, would be needed here. First the  
author should convince the reader that the "Individualised cognitive  
analysis" is indeed a valid method and does replace conventional  
approaches and then the author should prove that his method really tells  
something about consciousness and provides something beyond anecdotal  
verbalised introspection. This is not done here. This is one reason why  








(A) These two reviews flatly contradict each other. 
 
One: "The only reliable psychological data regarding consciousness are first-person data based on 
reports of subjective experiences." 
 
Two: " ,,, the author should prove that his method really ...  provides something beyond anecdotal 
verbalised introspection" 
 
You can draw any conclusion whatsoever from a contradiction - rejection or acceptance - or 
revision - or other reviewers. 
 
(B) Both reviewers attack the paper by mere fiat ("opinion").   
 
One: "discrimination [or] detection" (e.g. of sugar in a cup of tea) by a first-person expression of 
subjective experience (like "It seems sweet to me") is classified a priori as "third-person data".   
 
Two: my method of "discrimination scaling" (e.g. of sugar in a cup of tea) by "anecdotal verbalised 
introspection" (like "It seems sweet to me") does not count as "empirically grounded structure" 
(despite the publications in psychological and other scientific journals cited on my website).  
 
(C) May I suggest therefore that it could be very unfortunate to reject a paper on the basis of an 
incoherent display of presuppositions about the status of the concept of a conscious (or 
unconscious) cognitive/mental process within psychological science of the last 20 years?  It's hard 
to believe that either of these reviewers is acquainted with the current discipline, even as little as 
the engineers and philosophers (of consciousness) who have commented on the paper.    
 






On 27 Jul 2004 at 15:42, Anthony Freeman wrote: 
 
Date sent:       Tue, 27 Jul 2004 15:42:58 +0100 
To:              David Booth <D.A.Booth@bham.ac.uk> 
From:            Editor <Editor@imprint.co.uk> 
Subject:         JCS Submission 
 
Dear Mr Booth 
 
I have now received two substantial reviews of your paper on 
"Scientific requirements for an engineered model of consciousness". 
Neither referee advises acceptance of the paper for publication in 
this journal and the editors are following that recommendation. 
 
For your information I attach the two reviews, but this should not be 
construed as an invitation to resubmit a revised version of the paper. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Editor 
 
